

One Day We Will Have Always Responded To Your Satisfaction
Tyron Goldschmidt and Sam Lebens

We thank our critics for their consideration of our paper and for their insightful comments. Below are our responses.

1. Hud Hudson objects to one of the strategies in our paper: the heavenly supertask.

Our reply: Hudson's objection seems correct. In line with his recommendation, we prefer to rely on the second strategy in the paper: hyper-presentism and the moving spotlight, with scene changes in the dark. The proposal of a heavenly supertask was included in the paper, to explore how far Hudson's own work—with its robust ontological commitment to the hyper-past—could be stretched. Hudson's criticism shows that we likely stretched his picture too far. To purge reality of evil, God would have to create a hyper-presentistic universe, as per, our second strategy.

2a. Ryan Mullins first objects that amputation deprives the remaining 'person-stages' of personal identity: in virtue of what are these stages of the same person?

Our reply: various answers seem available. For example, the stages might be of the same person in virtue of being connected to the same soul, or in virtue of their psychological or bodily similarity, or even in virtue God's thinking of them as the same person (see Edwards's proposal at footnote 23 of our paper).

2b. Mullins next objects that deletion results in the relevant stages of the victimized person being deleted, whereas they are in need of healing and justice.

Our reply: deletion need not result in the person stages of the victim being deleted. But the stages will no longer be victimized, and thus no longer in need of healing and justice. The paper also proposes the possibility that God brings justice and healing before removing the injustice and its effects from the timeline.

3a. Seacord and Hochstetter first object that most of history would have to be deleted, and this is too high a price to pay.

Our reply: we do not see that most of history would have to be deleted, or that this is too high a price to pay. What is deleted is all evil. This is a good deal. If the worry is instead that God doesn't delete *enough*, since he would delete the sins but not the human frailties that gave rise to them, then we reply that God might delete the frailties too. In any case, we're happy with God deleting as much evil as he can and will, which we take to be a great deal.

3b. Seacord and Hochstetter next object that our proposal entails a contradiction: if God deleted something from history, then it must have existed in order to have been deleted, and thus it would have both existed *and* not existed.

Our reply: The contradiction arises from their use of traditional tense operators. But our strategy uses hyper-tense operators. We agree that God *can't* have deleted something from the timeline if that thing never existed. On our view, however, he *could* have **hyper**-deleted something that **hyper**-used to be on the timeline, but which never *was* on the timeline, even though it **hyper**-was once on the timeline. There is no contradiction, so long as care is taken with the traditional tense and hyper-tense operators.

3c. Seacord and Hochstetter next argue that our proposal doesn't entail that all evil will be removed: On our proposal, God replaces the evil that he deletes with hyper-backward looking properties. Thus, something **hyper**-happened, even if it never happened. According to Seacord and Hochstetter, this then entails that the hyper-past event in question exists. The evil remains.

Our reply: Hyper-presentism is supposed to be analogous with presentism. On Zimmerman's presentism, backward-looking properties only entail that something *happened*, and not that a past events *exist*. We propose that hyper-backward-looking properties only entail that something hyper-happened, and not that the hyper-past event exists. There is only one timeline, which changes over the course of hyper-time. For God to have **hyper**-removed an evil from the timeline, it doesn't ever have to have been a part of the timeline. It merely needs to have **hyper**-been a part of the timeline. Resolutely hyper-presentistic, we see no reason why this entails that the existence of any **hyper**-past evils, **hyper**-after God's **hyper**-deletions. If Seacord and Hochstetter have no problem with Zimmerman's proposal here, then they should not have a problem with ours.

3d. Seacord and Hochstetter finally object that our account doesn't allow God to forget the sins deleted: the world's hyper-containing sins will cause God to remember that it hyper-contained sins, and to remember the sins thus contained.

Our reply: some presentists take memory to depend on the backward-looking properties instantiated by (or in) the present. For example: the present instantiates the backward-looking property of Clinton losing a presidential election. If we remember her losing, then our memory depends on that property. Memory then would be a *de dicto* affair. We don't stand related, *de re*, to (most or all of) what we remember, since what we remember (generally) no longer exists. Rather, we remember, *de dicto*, *that such-and-such* occurred. So much for the presentist.

We are *not* presentists. We think that the past exists. Accordingly, we think that (many or most of) our memories are *de re*. We remember Clinton's losing. We stand directly related to that existent past event. We do have some *de dicto* memories: we remember that such and such occurred, but we forget exactly when, and to whom. These memories are less rich and full-blooded.

Since we are not presentists but **hyper**-presentists, we allow the following: God remembers, *de re*, all the evils committed. But, even though they **hyper**-happened, evils that **hyper**-were

deleted do *not* exist. Thus God cannot remember them *de re*. God's memory here will be *de dicto*, and thus less substantial. This is the 'garlic peel' we mention. Note that the *de re* memory that **hyper**-was has **hyper**-disappeared. If is replaced, then it is by something less substantial. Ultimately, God *can't* remember things that didn't happen: **hyper**-after deletion, the evils did not happen. What God knows of them can't be *de re*, but only *de dicto*.

If we've made any mistakes in this response, God will have a *de re* memory of them; hyper-until he hyper-will remove them. Hyper-then, there hyper-will never have been a *de re* memory of them, since there never will have been any mistakes in this response. God's knowledge of any such mistakes, will be like the *de dicto* knowledge he has of distant possible worlds.